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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONINDIANS IN THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION
There are three express references to Indians in the present New
Mexico constitution. These references are in Article VII, Section 1,
concerning qualification of voters, Article XIX, Section 2, concerning control of Indian lands, and Article XIX, Section 8, concerning
the introduction of liquor into Indian country. The Constitutional
Revision Commission has proposed the deletion of the reference to
Indians in Article VII, Section 1 and the retention of both provisions
in Article XIX. In addition, the commission has recommended insertion of new material concerning state assumption of jurisdiction
over Indian lands. The three existing provisions and the recommended addition are analyzed below. Insertion of the new material
is questioned, but otherwise the recommendations of the commission
are supported.
Article VII, Section 1 of the existing constitution denies the
franchise to "Indians not taxed."' The revision commission has
suggested the deletion of that phrase from the new constitution.2 As
the commission has noted, the New Mexico supreme court has recently upheld the Indians' right to vote despite the constitutional
limitation. 3 Furthermore, the restriction is in apparent conflict with
Article XXI, Section 5, which provides that "This state shall never
enact any law restricting or abridging the right of suffrage on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. ' 4 Finally,
since Indians are subject to federal5 and, increasingly, state taxation,6 the provision would have slight significance if retained. Thus
the commission's suggestion should be followed.
At the time New Mexico entered the Union, the United States
1. N.M. Const. art. VII, § 1 reads in part: "Every male citizen . . . except idiots,
insane persons, persons convicted of a felonious or infamous crime . . . and Indians
not taxed, shall be qualified to vote at all elections for public officers ....
2. Report of New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission 205-06 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report].
3. Id. at 206. The case so holding is Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387
(1962).
4. The commission has noted this inconsistency, which apparently stems from the
fact that Indians are the only people disenfranchised because "not taxed." Commission
Report 205.
5. W. Brophy & S. Aberle, The Indian: America's Unfinished Business, Report of
the Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian
16 (1966).
6. Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue,-N.M.-, 451 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1969), has
extended the taxing power of the state over reservation Indians to include state income tax.
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required that it incorporate certain provisions into its constitution.7
These provisions required by the Enabling Act became the compact
provisions of Article XXI, Sections 1-9. Before deleting or amending any of the compact provisions, the state must first be given permission by Congress.8 Once permission is granted, the proposed
change must be approved by the legislature and the electorate.' Since
the legislature will not vote on the constitution submitted by the
convention,' ° and since, with one possible exception," Congress has
not given its permission to change any of the existing compact provisions, the revision commission has recommended the retention of
all of these sections intact.' 2 The commission has suggested, however, that congressional consent "be obtained for deleting some of
the provisions now embodied in the present Compact with the
United States." 13 While the commission does not refer to any specific
sections, it is likely that one provision which should ultimately be
excised is Article XXI, Section 8.'4
Article XXI, Section 8 is one of two provisions concerning the
introduction of liquor into Indian land which appeared in the original constitution. In 1953, New Mexico repealed a constitutional
prohibition of the "sale, barter, or gift of intoxicating liquors to
Indians or the introduction of such liquors into Indian country.""'
The remaining provision requires that Indian lands, including
Pueblos, remain subject to all laws of the United States concerning
the introduction of liquor into Indian country for a period of twenty7. Enabling Act for New Mexico, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557. This Act requires
the insertion of several provisions in the New Mexico constitution as a condition to becoming a state. These provisions constitute a compact between New Mexico and the
United States.
8. Id. This requirement is reproduced at N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 10.
9. N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 4:
When the United States shall consent thereto, the legislature, by a majority vote
of the members in each house, may submit to the people the question of amending any provision of Article XXI of this Constitution on Compact with the
United States to the extent allowed by the Act of Congress permitting the same,
and if a majority of the qualified electors who vote upon any such amendment
shall vote in favor thereof, the said article shall be thereby amended accordingly.
10. Supplemental Report of New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission 12-13
(1969). This procedure is officially outlined at N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 2.
11. This exception is N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 2, discussed infra.
12. Commission Report 208.
13. Id.
14. In the new constitution proposed by the commission, this provision would appear
as Article XIV, Section 16.
15. The repealed provision was originally a part of N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 1.
Congressional permission for the repeal was granted at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1953). State
legislative approval was granted at N.M. Laws 1953, ch. 623. Repeal was consummated at a special state election on September 15, 1953.
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five years following the allotment, sale, reservation, or disposal of
such lands. Curiously, this remaining provision is more outmoded
than the one repealed. It seems to be a relic of the Dawes Act. Enacted in 1887, the Dawes Act provided for allotments of tribal land
to individual Indians, allegedly for the purpose of assimilating the
Indian to the ways of private ownership. Allotments under the Act
were to be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years or
longer before a fee patent would be issued. This Act represented
the federal approach to Indians at the time New Mexico became a
state, and the twenty-five year period in the liquor provision at N.M.
Const. art. XXI, § 8 was apparently designed to correspond to the
grace period of trust under the Dawes Act. Aside from its role as
a memorial to our past failures in the area of Indian Affairs, the
Dawes Act is of no import today.16
When New Mexico was given permission to amend Article XXI,
Section 1, thereby removing one of the two liquor provisions, Arizona, which had the same two provisions in its constitution, was
allowed to remove them both.' 7 There is no need whatsoever for the
remaining New Mexico provision today, since federal prohibitions
on liquor in Indian country have been removed so long as state and
tribal laws are followed.' Thus there is no federal law to be applied
to such lands; liquor control in Indian country is now in the hands of
the states and the tribes. Since the convention could not legally delete
the provision, it should be retained as suggested and then properly
repealed after the new constitution is adopted.'"
Article XXI, Section 2 is the most problematic compact provision
in the existing constitution because it contains, among other things,
an apparent disclaimer of state jurisdiction over Indian lands.20 The
general question of jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands is
beyond the scope of this Comment, 21 which is restricted to the practi16. Brophy & Aberle, .rupra note 5, at 18-20.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1953).
18. Id.
19. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
20. The provision reads in part:
"Sec. 2. [Control of unappropriated or Indian lands-Taxation of federal government, nonresident, and Indian property.] The people inhabiting this state
do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to . . . all
lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired through the United
States, or any prior sovereignty; and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject
to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. .. "
21. This question is among the liveliest in the area of Indian law. In addition to
innumerable law review articles on the subject, an especially helpful presentation is M.

JULY 1969]

INDIANS IN THE CONSTITUTION

cal question of what to do with existing Article XX122 and the material proposed by the commission as the new Article XIV, Section 8.
Article XXI, Section 2 can only be changed in the manner noted
above in the discussion of Article XXI, Section 8. However, Article
XXI, Section 2 is unique among the Compact provisions in that congress has apparently given permission to change it. In Public Law
280, Congress provided that the states could assume jurisdiction
over Indians and that states having constitutional impediments to
such assumption could remove them. 3 While certain provisions of24
that Act were repealed or modified by the 1968 Civil Rights Act,
the permission to amend impeding constitutions was not retracted.
Clearly Congress intended that its permission concerned compact
provisions in state constitutions, since such permission would otherwise be unnecessary.
The revision commission has suggested that all of the compact
sections in the present constitution be retained; that legally no
changes could be made at this time. 25 Such legal impediment is not,
however, lack of congressional opinion; it is Article XIX, Section 4
of the present constitution. If New Mexico required only the consent
of Congress and the state electorate to change Article XXI, Section
2, it could be changed by the convention. However, since Article
XIX, Section 4 requires that such changes be approved by the state
legislature and then submitted to the people, the convention is legally
powerless to accept the invitation from Congress to amend Article
XIX, Section 2.
In lieu of an alteration of Article XIX, Section 2, the commission
has suggested the insertion of the following new material at Article
XIV, Section 8: "The legislature of the state is empowered to assume and assert state governmental jurisdiction to the extent permitted by law over Indian lands and pueblos situate within the state,
whenever in the discretion of the legislature such action is desirable." 2 6 This would be an inadvisable provision. If the new material
Price, American Indian Legal Problems, Cases and Materials, chs. I & IA (1968) (unpublished materials for classroom use).
22. In the proposed constitution, this provision would be Article XIV, Section 10.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1953):
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a
state, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State
to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the
case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and
criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act. . ....
24. Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-24 (1968). The most significant modification of former law by the Civil Rights Act is the requirement that tribal consent precede
any assumption of jurisdiction by the state.
25. Commission Report 208.
26. Id. at 202.
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is included without changing existing Article XXI, Section 2, there
will be an inconsistency in the constitution. In some admittedly unclear sense 27 Article XXI, Section 2 is a disclaimer of state jurisdiction, which would conflict with the proposed assumption section.
Subsequent modification of the compact provision could remove the
inconsistency, but the better approach is to avoid inconsistency altogether, while at the same time furthering the general purpose of
avoiding unnecessary grants of powers to the legislature.
If the new material were included at Article XIV, Section 8, there
would still be an impediment to jurisdiction in the compact provision.
If the new material were not included, the only impediments would
be the compact provision, and, since the 1968 Civil Rights Act, tribal
consent. This is so because of the nature of state government. As
noted in the introduction to the 1967 report,28 state constitutions,
unlike the federal constitution, are not grants of power; thus the state
may generally exercise any powers not specifically withheld by state
or federal constitutions or statutes. The state need not give itself
the power to assume jurisdiction over Indian lands; it need only remove any existing limitations on such power. When the existing constitutional impediment to the assumption of jurisdiction is removed,
the legislature is free to enact such an assumption. No grant of
power to do so is required. Furthermore, if the new material were
included, it would simply be unnecessary clutter in the constitution
once the legislature acts to assume jurisdiction.
GREGORY PEASE

27. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961),
interpreted the provision as a very broad disclaimer of state jurisdiction over Indians.
Recent cases have analogized from the Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar provision in the Alaska constitution as merely a disclaimer of proprietary jurisdiction.
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). See Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M.
562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966) ; Batchelor v. Charley, 74 N.M. 717, 398 P.2d 49 (1965) ; State
v. Warner, 71 N.M. 418, 379 P.2d 66 (1963) ; and Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196,
372 P.2d 387 (1962). However, despite the many cases in which the disclaimer is discussed and restricted, its meaning remains unclear, since congressional permission to
remove it would make no sense at all if it were applicable only to jurisdiction over real
property as suggested by the more recent cases. This is so because both former law and
the 1968 Civil Rights Act specifically exempt Indian realty from any possible state assumption of jurisdiction.
28. Commission Report 5.

